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IS TENNESSEE’S VERSION OF THE “JOCK
TAX” UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
ALAN POGROSZEWSKI & KARI A. SMOKER
I. INTRODUCTION
Jon DiSalvatore is in his tenth year as a professional hockey player.1 Over
those 10 years, he has played in 725 professional games in the American
Hockey League (AHL) and, until last year, had played in only 5 National
Hockey League (NHL) games, all during the 2005–2006 season with the St.
Louis Blues.2 On December 28, 2011, DiSalvatore was called up from
Houston to join the NHL’s Minnesota Wild in Nashville to play in its game
against the Predators.3 While playing in the NHL is still a dream of
DiSalvatore’s, he did not expect the monetary price he would have to pay for
the one game he played in the NHL last season.
Jon DiSalvatore played under a two-way contract that paid him $550,000
annually if at any time during the 2011–2012 season he performed services in
the NHL.4 DiSalvatore’s contract thus afforded him slightly more than the
$525,000 NHL league minimum.5 Had DiSalvatore performed services only
 Alan Pogroszewski is an Assistant Professor of Sports Studies at St. John Fisher College and
the President of his own tax consulting business, whose clientele include professional athletes
performing services on three separate continents. Prior to accepting his position at St. John Fisher
College, Mr. Pogroszewski was the Vice President of Business Operations for Sports Consulting
Group, a firm that specializes in the representation of professional hockey players. Mr. Pogroszewski
received his M.B.A. from Rochester Institute of Technology in 1996 and his M.S. in Taxation from
St. John Fisher in 2003.
 Kari A. Smoker is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the State University of New
York, College at Brockport, and the President-Elect of the Greater Rochester Association of Women
Attorneys, a chapter of the Women's Bar Association of the State of New York. Ms. Smoker received
her J.D. from The Ohio State University in 2000 and was admitted to the New York State Bar in
2001. She earned her M.S. in Taxation from Golden Gate University in 2010.
1. Jon DiSalvatore, ELITE PROSPECTS, http://www.eliteprospects.com/player.php?player=9451
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
2. Id.
3. Jon DiSalvatore Game-by-Game Stats, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nhl/player/gamelog/_/id/2
169/jon-disalvatore (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
4. See Jon DiSalvatore, CAPGEEK.COM, http://www.capgeek.com/players/display.php?id=1523
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
5. Collective Bargaining Agreement FAQs, NHL, http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=26366
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
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in the AHL, he would have earned his minor league salary, which was
considerably less. Because DiSalvatore played in only one game in the NHL
last year, it is easy to determine the tax consequences for that particular game.
The Minnesota Wild used 185 working days (duty days) during the 2011–2012
NHL season in determining Mr. DiSalvatore’s daily earnings, which translated
into $2,972.97 each day.6 His income earned for this one game in the NHL
was then subject to both federal and state taxes in addition to Tennessee’s
Professional Privilege Tax, a flat $2,500 fee assessed on NHL and National
Basketball Association (NBA) players for the privilege of playing a game in
Tennessee.7
TABLE I
Duty
Days

Salary

Income
Per
Day

Federal
Tax

Social
Security

Medicare

185

$550,000.00

$2,972.97

$489.05

$97.02

$43.11

Tennessee
Privilege
Tax
$2,500.00

Total
Tax

Net

$3,129.18

-$156.21

As the table above illustrates, the one game Jon DiSalvatore played in
Nashville cost him a hefty price, resulting in a $156.21 net loss.
With states looking for ways to increase their revenues, non-resident
professional athletes are attractive targets for state tax collectors. They cannot
avoid the taxing jurisdiction because the cities in which they play are
predetermined.8 Nor can non-resident athletes “express their displeasure in
the voting booth.”9
Much has been made of the “jock tax” and its implications for professional
athletes. It will generate over $3,000,000 annually in additional tax revenue
6. In this example, we use the method that the Minnesota Wild used in determining Jon
DiSalvatore’s daily income, dividing his annual NHL salary by the 185 days during the 2011–2012
NHL season. Later in this article, we discuss a method for determining an appropriate allocation of
income earned in a state as a non-resident. This method includes adding the athlete’s preseason and
postseason days. See In re White, No. TSB-H-80-(93)-I, 1980 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 535, at *1–3 (Tax
Comm’n June 20, 1980). Using the method established in White, the example above would need to
include the NHL preseason, which for the Minnesota Wild began on September 15, 2011. Training
camp scrimmages began on September 17, 2011. 2011–2012 Minnesota Wild Training Camp
Scrimmages, MINN. WILD, http://wild.nhl.com/club/page.htm?id=73176 (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
However, players were required to report two days earlier for a media day and testing for
conditioning, hence the September 15 start date. Therefore, the total number of days would equal
207.
7. TENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, NOTICE #09-13, PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE TAX FOR
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES (2009), available at http://www.tn.gov/revenue/notices/professional/0913.pdf [hereinafter NOTICE 09-13].
8. See Robert D. Plattner, FTA Recommendations on Taxing Nonresident Athletes Could Have
Wider Application, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES, Mar.–Apr. 1995, at 36, 36.
9. Id.
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for the state of Tennessee alone.10 However, should Tennessee’s version of
the jock tax prove to be unconstitutional, the state is susceptible to potential
lawsuits from both the NHL Players’ Association and the National Basketball
Player’s Association, costing it not only the tax revenue collected but also
attorneys’ fees and the administrative costs it incurred in implementing the
tax.
Professional sports are a big business, and athletes need to be aware of the
current financial landscape. Taxes are a critical part of that landscape.11 With
just under 1,000 full-time individuals performing services as professional
athletes in the NHL and the NBA—and with nearly all players in both leagues
scheduled to play in either Nashville or Memphis over the next several
years—each one of these athletes needs to understand how he will be affected
by this tax.
Athletes like Jon DiSalvatore undoubtedly believe that Tennessee’s
Professional Privilege Tax is unfair. This article examines whether the tax is
unconstitutional, and the notion of “fairness” is certainly an important
consideration. Section II outlines Tennessee’s version of the jock tax. Section
III discusses the constitutional constraints under both the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause that are imposed on a state’s power to lay taxes. It
also evaluates whether Tennessee’s jock tax is unconstitutional, examining
(i) whether there is a sufficient connection that the state has with NHL and
NBA athletes and their income; (ii) whether the tax is fairly apportioned;
(iii) whether non-resident athletes are unfairly discriminated against, whether
10. Prior to the NHL lockout, the NHL’s Nashville Predators had forty-one home games
scheduled during the 2012–2013 season. See 2012–13 Wild Schedule Set, MINN. WILD (June 20,
2012), http://wild.nhl.com/club/news.htm?id=635276. Each NHL team is comprised of twenty
players for games (eighteen skaters and two goaltenders as per rule 5.1 “Eligible Players” in the NHL
Rule Book). NHL OFFICIAL RULES 2011–2012 § 2-5.1. With each player paying $2,500 in tax for
each game played in the state, the total revenue produced is $2,200,000. The NBA’s Memphis
Grizzlies have forty-one home games scheduled during the 2012–2013 season. Grizzlies Schedules &
Results, GRIZZLIES.COM, http://www.nba.com/grizzlies/schedule#.USmZr-PZ8Vk (last visited
Mar. 26, 2013). Each NBA team is composed of twelve players, with at least eight dressed and able
to play in any regular season game. Roster Regulations, NBA (Oct. 22, 2001), http://www.nba.com/
analysis/00421026.html. With each player paying $2,500 in tax for each game played in the state,
this produces potential total revenue of $1,320,000. During the 2012–2013 season, no NHL or NBA
team, other than the Nashville Predators and the Memphis Grizzlies, is scheduled to play in
Tennessee more than three times. Should an individual athlete play more than three games in
Tennessee over that time frame (such as a member of the Nashville Predators or the Memphis
Grizzlies or an athlete who has switched teams during the season), he would not be subject to the
$2,500 tax after his third game, as the tax is capped at a maximum of three games per player. See
infra Section II.
11. See generally Alan Pogroszewski, Is Canada Overstepping Its Borders? The Alberta
Province Tax Specifically Targets Professional Hockey Players in Order to Help Finance Its
Professional Franchises, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 509 (2004).
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the jock tax could have an adverse effect on interstate commerce, or both; and
(iv) whether the services that non-resident athletes receive from Tennessee are
in proportion to the tax they pay. The article then concludes with the authors’
opinions that Tennessee’s version of the jock tax has gone too far.
II. BACKGROUND
Effective July 1, 2009, the Tennessee Department of Revenue began
imposing a professional privilege tax on athletes who play in the NHL and
NBA.12 Those athletes are assessed a $2,500 tax for each game they play, up
to a maximum of three games, in the state of Tennessee.13 The tax is imposed
whether they play for the Memphis Grizzlies, the Nashville Predators, or for
an opposing team.14
Non-resident taxation of professional athletes is nothing new. The issue
gained national attention in the early 1990s when Philadelphia began assessing
a city tax on non-resident athletes and Illinois implemented a jock tax in
retaliation against California’s non-resident tax, which was assessed to
“Michael Jordan and his Chicago Bulls teammates following their 1991
[NBA] Championship against the Los Angeles Lakers.”15 Despite the
publicity that these tax assessments generated, “California had [actually] been
taxing nonresident athletes as early as 1968, while New York has been doing
so since 1971.”16
Although athletes have been subject to non-resident income taxes for
many years, Tennessee’s version is unique. First, the tax is a flat tax as
opposed to a tax based on a percentage of income or some other relevant tax
base.17 Second, the tax is assessed only on athletes performing services in the
NBA and NHL, but not in the National Football League (NFL).18 Those
athletes who perform services under a minor league contract—or under a twoway contract but who have not been on the roster for more than ten days
during the tax year—are exempt from the Tennessee Professional Privilege

12. NOTICE 09-13, supra note 7.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Alan Pogroszewski, When is a CPA as Important as Your ERA? A Comprehensive
Evaluation and Examination of State Tax Issues on Professional Athletes, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
395, 395 (2009).
16. Id. (citing In re Partee, 1976 Cal. Tax LEXIS 35 (Bd. of Equalization Oct. 6, 1976); In re
White, No. TSB-H-80-(93)-I, 1980 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 535, at *1–3 (Tax Comm’n June 20, 1980)). For
a more informative breakdown on the history of the taxation of non-resident athletes, see id.
17. NOTICE 09-13, supra note 7.
18. See id.
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Tax.19
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Although Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution establishes the dual
sovereignty of the states and the federal government,20 the Supreme Court has
on many occasions invalidated state tax measures on constitutional grounds.
What has evolved is a rich body of case law—albeit confusing and often
inconsistent—21in which the Supreme Court has developed a framework for
determining the constitutionality of state tax measures under both the Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.
A. Due Process
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits
states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”22 The Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is a venerable if
trite observation that seizure of property by the State under pretext of taxation
when there is no jurisdiction or power to tax is simple confiscation and a
denial of due process of law.”23 In determining whether a state has the
jurisdiction to impose a tax, the Court will adhere to a “time-honored concept:
that due process requires some definite link, some minimum connection,
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.”24
Nevertheless, there has been some inconsistency in the Court’s rulings as
to the minimum connection required between the state and a person in order
for the state to have jurisdiction to impose a tax on him.25 Consider, for
instance, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue in which the
Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a use tax on sales the taxpayer
19. Id.
20. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
21. Even the Supreme Court has observed:
Our decisions are not always clear as to the grounds on which a tax is supported,
especially where more than one exists; nor are all of our pronouncements during the
experimental period of this type of taxation[, use tax,] consistent or reconcilable. A few
have been specifically overruled, while others no longer fully represent the present state
of the law.

Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 342.
24. Id. at 344–45.
25. See John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy
Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 321, 365–73 (2003) for an in-depth discussion of nexus in
the context of state taxation.
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made within the state.26 The Court held that the minimum connection required
by the Due Process Clause is the taxpayer’s physical presence in the state.27
The Court revisited the issue, however, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, noting
that “due process jurisprudence has evolved substantially in the [twenty-five]
years since Bellas Hess.”28 It held that physical presence was not required.29
Rather, “there is no question that Quill . . . purposefully directed its activities
at North Dakota residents [and] that the magnitude of those contacts is more
than sufficient for due process purposes . . . .”30 Thus, for purposes of
imposing a use tax, the minimum contact required between the taxing state and
a person is the person’s “economic” presence within the state.
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the Due Process requirements
for a professional privilege tax like Tennessee’s, Tennessee imposes the tax
only on those professional athletes who are performing services inside the
state’s borders. Therefore, it appears that there is a sufficient connection
between the athlete and the state, whether it is measured by the physical
presence standard articulated in National Bellas Hess or by the more flexible
standard articulated in Quill Corp., such that the athlete has an economic
presence in the state of Tennessee. Tennessee’s jock tax does not seem to
violate the Due Process Clause.
The question that remains, then, is whether Tennessee’s Professional
Privilege Tax can be successfully challenged under the Commerce Clause.
B. The Commerce Clause
The framework for determining the constitutionality of a state tax under
the Commerce Clause has evolved over the years, and there are several key
26. See generally Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled
by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
27. Id. at 758. The taxpayer in question was a mail order company. Id. at 753. Because it had
no contact with the state other than deliveries made through the U.S. mail and common carrier, the
Supreme Court held that the taxpayer had no physical contact with the state, and thus the state use tax
was unconstitutional. Id. at 758.
28. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 308. The Court actually stated that “there is no question that Quill has purposefully
directed its activities at North Dakota residents, that the magnitude of those contacts is more than
sufficient for due process purposes, and that the use tax is related to the benefits Quill receives from
access to the State.” Id. (emphasis added). However, the last requirement—that the tax is related to
the benefits the taxpayer receives from his access to the state—is not actually a requirement under the
Due Process Clause. See id. at 307–08. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, apparently
confused the requirements of the Due Process Clause with those of the Commerce Clause. See
Brandon F. White, Case Note, State Taxation on the Privilege of Doing Interstate Business: Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 19 B.C. L. REV. 312, 323 n.81 (1978).
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points. First, the Supreme Court’s decisions respond to very specific state tax
measures.31 Because Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax is unique, there
are no cases that specifically address the constitutionality of this particular tax.
Another important point, however, is that all state taxes are subject to scrutiny
under the Commerce Clause using the very same analytical framework. Its
purpose is to prevent state regulation from impeding interstate commerce.32
A third and related point is that the name of the tax is immaterial in
determining its constitutionality. Rather, it is the effect of the tax that will
determine whether it is unconstitutional.33 This is important because the
Tennessee tax is a so-called “privilege of doing business” tax.34 In Complete
Auto Transit v. Brady, there was no objection to the sales tax in question other
than the fact that it was called a privilege of doing business tax.35 Because the
tax was not challenged on any other grounds, it was upheld.36 Complete Auto
Transit is not authority for the proposition that Tennessee’s Professional
Privilege Tax is constitutional. It simply underscores the importance of
evaluating the effects of the tax in determining its constitutionality.
Complete Auto Transit is important for another reason. It is a landmark
case in which the Supreme Court provided an analytical framework for
determining the constitutionality of a state tax under the Commerce Clause. In
order to be valid, the Supreme Court held that a state tax must be “applied to
an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [must be] fairly

31. The Supreme Court has remarked, “[W]e have described our own decisions in this area as a
‘quagmire’ of judicial responses to specific state tax measures . . . .” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987) (citing Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 457–58 (1959)).
32. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312; see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 278 (1977).
“[T]he Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for
the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force
created an area of trade free from interference by the States. In short, the Commerce
Clause [. . .] is a limitation upon the power of the States. . . . This limitation on State
power . . . does not merely forbid a State to single out interstate commerce for hostile
action. A State is also precluded from taking any action which may fairly be deemed to
have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between States. It is immaterial that
local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance.”

Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 278 n.7 (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946),
overruled on other grounds by Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995)).
33. See Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 288 (“There is no economic consequence that
follows necessarily from the use of the particular words, ‘privilege of doing business,’ and a focus on
that formalism merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect.”).
34. Id. at 289.
35. See id.
36. Id.
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apportioned, [must] not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [must
be] fairly related to the services provided by the State.”37
1. Substantial Nexus with the Taxing State
“Nexus” actually has two distinct meanings for state tax jurisdiction: (1)
nexus with the taxpayer and (2) nexus with the income, transaction, activity, or
property sought to be taxed.38
In Section II.A we examined nexus with the taxpayer—the minimum
connection between the state and a person that is required in order for the state
to have the jurisdiction to impose a tax on him—within the context of the Due
Process Clause. The purpose of the Due Process Clause, however, differs
significantly from that of the Commerce Clause. The former ensures that
taxpayers are fairly warned that they may be subject to a state’s taxing
jurisdiction.39 The latter prohibits states from overreaching and interfering
with interstate commerce.40 Therefore, the nexus requirement of each clause
may differ significantly.
So, what is the nexus with the taxpayer that is required under the
Commerce Clause? As it relates to state sales and use tax, the Supreme Court
in Quill Corp. stated that the taxpayer has to have some physical presence in
the state.41 However, it suggested that the standard for taxes other than sales
and use tax may not be physical presence, implying that a taxpayer’s economic
presence may be enough.42 The result is that there is a great deal of
uncertainty as to the applicable standard for other state taxes, including state
income tax, and state courts are divided as to whether the standard is physical
presence or mere economic presence.43 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
not answered the question.44
Notwithstanding, Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax is assessed to
NHL and NBA athletes, like Jon DiSalvatore, who play a game in the state of
Tennessee. To the extent that the athlete is present in the state at the time he is

37. Id. at 279.
38. See 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 6.01 (3d ed.
1998).
39. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992).
40. Id. at 309.
41. See id. at 312–13.
42. See id. at 317.
43. Swain, supra note 25, at 321–22.
44. See id. at 321, 339–43 (explaining that the Supreme Court's exploration of the constitutional
limits of income tax jurisdiction has been stymied by Congress’s enactment of legislation as an
affirmative exercise of its Commerce Clause powers).
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performing services, there is sufficient nexus under either standard.
The other distinct meaning of nexus in the context of state tax jurisdiction
concerns whether there is a sufficient connection between the state and the
income, transaction, activity, or property it seeks to tax.45 This is consistent
with the first part of the four-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Complete Auto Transit—that the state tax must be applied to an activity that
has substantial nexus with the taxing state.46 We shall see, however, that
while the Supreme Court articulated four seemingly different parts to its fourpart test, the parts are very much interrelated. For example, whether there is
sufficient nexus with the income, transaction, or activity sought to be taxed is
usually viewed as a fair apportionment issue.47 We turn to the fair
apportionment requirement next.
2. The Tax is Fairly Apportioned
The purpose of the fair apportionment requirement is to ensure that a state
taxes no more than its “fair share” of an interstate activity.48 In determining
whether a tax is fairly apportioned, the Supreme Court has articulated two
separate tests: the “internal consistency” test and the “external consistency”
test.49
The internal consistency test focuses on the potential strain that a state tax
might place on interstate commerce.50 It examines whether the state tax
measure, if adopted by all fifty states, would result in heavier taxes being
imposed on interstate commerce than if the commerce was purely intrastate.51
If the state tax measure places interstate commerce at a disadvantage, then it is
invalid under the Commerce Clause because it interferes with free trade
among the different states.52 The purpose of internal consistency, then, is to
45. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 38, at ¶ 6.01.
46. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
47. See Swain, supra note 25, at 328–29.
For example, the state of Arizona may have nexus with Acme Copper Company, but it
could not impose a severance tax measured by the copper that Acme extracts in Chile.
The question in this example is not whether Acme has Arizona nexus—it clearly does—
but whether the object or measure of the tax may be fairly apportioned to Arizona, i.e.,
whether the severance of Chilean copper has an Arizona nexus.

Id. at 329 n.36.
48. See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and the Prohibition on
Extraterritorial State Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 157–58 (2002).
49. Id. at 156.
50. See id.
51. Id.; see Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 296 (1987).
52. See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 296.
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ensure that the state tax measure does not discriminate against interstate
commerce—the third prong of the Complete Auto Transit test.53 Here, again,
we see that the four seemingly different prongs of the Complete Auto Transit
test are very much interrelated.
The external consistency test, on the other hand, focuses on whether the
state has a valid claim to the value it is taxing or whether it is reaching beyond
the value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within its borders.54 In
other words, it attempts to limit the value that is being taxed to the amount
with which the state has sufficient nexus.55 If each state taxes only that
portion of the value of the income, transaction, or activity fairly attributable to
economic activity within its jurisdiction, the taxpayer should not be subject to
state taxation on more than 100% of the total value.56 Thus, the purpose of
external consistency is to eliminate the risk of multiple taxation.57
In American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, the Supreme Court
determined that two different tax measures imposed on trucking businesses by
the State of Pennsylvania—a “marker fee” and an “axle tax”—58were
unconstitutional.59 Unlike a fuel consumption tax that is directly apportioned
to the mileage traveled in Pennsylvania, the taxes in question were flat taxes,
and the lack of apportionment doomed them to fail under the “internal
consistency” standard.60 “[T]heir inevitable effect [was] to threaten the free
movement of commerce by placing a financial barrier around the State of
Pennsylvania.”61 The Court held that “[i]f each State imposed flat taxes for
the privilege of making commercial entrances into its territory, there is no
conceivable doubt that commerce among the States would be deterred.”62 The
Court also acknowledged that it is not necessary for other jurisdictions to
actually impose a similar tax in order to prove that interstate commerce is at a
disadvantage.63 It did note, however, that the adoption of a similar tax
53. See id. at 281 (“In its guarantee of a free trade area among States, however, the Commerce
Clause has a deeper meaning that may be implicated even though state provisions, such as the ones
reviewed here, do not allocate tax burdens between insiders and outsiders in a manner that is facially
discriminatory.”).
54. See Joondeph, supra note 48, at 150, 158.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 271.
59. See id. at 269.
60. See id. at 283–84.
61. Id. at 284.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 285.
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measure by other jurisdictions even before the lawsuit was resolved “surely
suggest[ed] that acquiescence in these flat taxes would occasion manifold
threats to the national free trade area.”64
While the Court focused largely on the internal consistency issues posed
by the Pennsylvania tax, it did acknowledge another important concern. The
parties stipulated that if all states imposed the same flat tax, the cost for the
taxpayer to qualify its trucks in every state in which it drove would amount to
a total tax “many times larger” than the company’s net pretax income for the
year in question.65 This certainly poses a serious external consistency issue.
The Tennessee Professional Privilege Tax is similarly unapportioned and
poses serious issues under both the internal consistency and external
consistency standards. It imposes a flat $2,500 tax to NHL and NBA players
on a per game basis, up to a maximum of $7,500.66 If, as the Supreme Court
asserted in Scheiner, every jurisdiction “imposed flat taxes for the privilege of
making commercial entrances into its territory,”—in this instance, to play in
the NHL or NBA—”there is no conceivable doubt that commerce among the
States would be deterred” and that “acquiescence in these flat taxes would
occasion manifold threats to the national free trade area.”67 The Tennessee
Professional Privilege Tax thus violates the internal consistency standard.
Recall that the external consistency test focuses on whether the state has a
valid claim to the value it is taxing or whether it is reaching beyond the value
that is fairly attributable to economic activity within its borders.68 It attempts
to limit that value to the amount with which the state has sufficient nexus.69
Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax is a flat tax, and thus, there is a total
lack of apportionment. It raises serious questions as to the value that
Tennessee is taxing and whether that value is fairly attributable to economic
activity within its borders. The tax, thus, violates the external consistency
standard.
It is important to note at this juncture that state taxes have been upheld, in
a few exceptional cases, “as ‘fairly apportioned’ even though the taxes at issue
were, in actuality, completely unapportioned.”70 These cases presented
circumstances in which fair apportionment was “administratively cumbersome

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 285 nn.19–20.
NOTICE 09-13, supra note 7.
See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 284–85.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
Joondeph, supra note 48, at 151.
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or impractical.”71 In upholding the state tax measures, there were two key
considerations for the Court: that the tax did not discriminate against interstate
commerce and that it was not excessive, reflecting a “fair, if imperfect,
approximation” of the benefit conferred.72
This was the Court’s ruling in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority
District v. Delta Airlines, Inc.73 The tax in question was a $1 fee imposed by
the government for each passenger boarding a commercial aircraft operating
from the airport.74 Even though the $1 fee was unapportioned, it was upheld
because it satisfied two essential conditions in that it was neither
discriminatory nor excessive.75 The Court held that the fee did not
discriminate against interstate commerce because there were no inherent
differences between interstate and intrastate flights, and both were subject to
the same $1 charge.76 Nor was the charge excessive inasmuch as it
“reflect[ed] a fair, if imperfect, approximation of the use of facilities for whose
benefit they are imposed.”77
In contrast, the Scheiner Court held that the Pennsylvania flat tax satisfied
neither of these two essential conditions.78 It “discriminate[d] against out-ofstate vehicles by subjecting them to a much higher charge per mile traveled in
the State, and [it did] not even purport to approximate fairly the cost or value
of the use of Pennsylvania’s roads.”79 Much the same can be said of the
Tennessee Professional Privilege Tax. It discriminates against non-resident
athletes by subjecting them to a much higher charge per game than resident
athletes. Compare, for instance, the $2,500 fee paid per game by a nonresident athlete who plays 3 games in Tennessee with the $182.53 fee paid per
game by a resident athlete who plays 41 games in Tennessee.80 And does the
tax even purport to approximate fairly the cost or value of the athlete’s use of
Tennessee’s facilities? We think not.
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on fair apportionment as it
71. Id.
72. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 717
(1972).
73. See generally id.
74. Id. at 709.
75. Id. at 716–17, 719–20.
76. Id. at 717.
77. Id.
78. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 290 (1987).
79. Id.
80. See infra Table II and Table III, which outline the per-game tax for a non-resident athlete
performing services in the state of Tennessee in comparison to that of a resident athlete who plays a
full season in the state.
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pertains to state taxation of a professional athlete’s income, various state
courts have provided some guidance.81 The overriding construct is that there
is a reasonable attempt to realistically apportion income.
For instance, in order for apportionment to be fair and justifiable, an
appropriate apportionment factor should reflect the number of working days or
games played within each jurisdiction in proportion to the total number of
working days or total games in a season.82 In In re Partee, the California state
court noted that although the “working-day” formula was appropriate for
football, the “games-played” method may be more appropriate for other
sports, including baseball, basketball, and hockey.83
Second, the
apportionment formula should take into consideration the entire season,
including both the preseason and any championship playoff games.84
Although it is in the athlete’s self-interest to train year-round, his contract does
not require it, and therefore, off-season training should not be included in the
apportionment formula.85
To illustrate the total number of working days in a season, which is the
standard for apportioning income for players in the NHL, we will use as an
example an athlete performing services with the Minnesota Wild during the
2011–2012 NHL season. The denominator in the apportionment factor would
include the NHL preseason, which for the Minnesota Wild began on
September 15, 2011, and would include all days through the last game day of
the season, which was April 7, 2012.86 Thus, for apportionment purposes
there was a total of 207 duty days for the 2011–2012 season.
Finally, the apportionment formula should include all income associated
with the performance of the athlete’s services, including salary, performance

81. See generally, e.g., Wilson v. Franchise Tax Bd., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282 (Ct. App. 1993); In
re Foster, 1984 Cal. Tax LEXIS 18 (Bd. of Equalization Nov. 14, 1984); In re Partee, 1976 Cal. Tax
LEXIS 35 (Bd. of Equalization Oct. 6, 1976); In re White, No. TSB-H-80-(93)-I, 1980 N.Y. Tax
LEXIS 535 (N.Y. Tax Comm’n June 20, 1980); In re Dorsey, No. 87-I-168, 1989 Wis. Tax LEXIS 8
(Tax App. Comm’n Mar. 17, 1989).
82. See In re Partee, 1976 Cal. Tax LEXIS 35, at *11–12.
83. Id. The court justified their ruling with the wording in Partee’s contract that “require[d]
each player to participate in practice sessions,” thus concluding “that professional football players are
paid for practices and necessary travel, as well as for playing in games.” Id. at *9.
84. See In re White, 1980 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 535, at *2–3. The court ruled that since White was
obligated to participate in spring training or face consequences, such as breach of contract, his salary
and compensation should have taken into consideration the exhibition games, even though he was not
paid directly for those games, as White had as much of a contractual and professional obligation to
participate in exhibition games as he did in regular season games. Id.
85. See Wilson, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289.
86. See 2011–2012 Schedule, MINN. WILD, http://wild.nhl.com/club/schedule.htm (last visited
Mar. 27, 2013).
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bonuses, and signing bonuses.87 A signing bonus should be included in total
income if the bonus received for signing the contract is either refundable (so
that it is conditioned on the athlete’s performance of services under the
contract) or is otherwise related to services performed over the length of the
contract.88
If Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax is evaluated within the construct
of a state income tax, the tax fails the fair apportionment requirement.
Tennessee’s tax is a flat tax and thus does not even attempt to fairly apportion
the income that an athlete earns. Table II below illustrates the consequences
for a hockey player who is employed by the Minnesota Wild of the NHL and
earns the $525,000 league minimum while performing services over 207 days
during the season. As a result of the $2,500 flat tax, this particular player’s
single game day in Tennessee will be taxed at a rate of 98.57%, a rate almost
in excess of 100% of his daily income.
Recall that whether a state tax measure is fairly apportioned is evaluated
under both the internal consistency and external consistency standards and that
the purpose of the external consistency standard is to eliminate the risk of
multiple taxation. Clearly, Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax violates the
external consistency standard. And even California, which has a maximum
income tax on both residents and non-residents of 10.3%, falls well below the
rate that Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax imposes on the athlete in our
example.
TABLE II
Salary

Total
Tax

Income
Per
Day

Tennessee
Privilege
Tax per
game

Tax
Rate

Net per
game

$525,000.00

$2,500.00

$2,536.23

$2,500.00

98.57%

$36.23

$2,500,000.00

$2,500.00

$12,077.29

$2,500.00

20.7%

$9,577.29

$7,500,000.00

$2,500.00

$36,231.88

$2,500.00

6.9%

$33,731.88

It should also be noted that because the income is not apportioned,
87. In re Foster, 1984 Cal. Tax LEXIS 18, at *6–7 (Bd. of Equalization Nov. 14, 1984). The
court ruled that Foster’s “playing bonus [was] plainly distinguishable from [that of] a signing bonus
as a matter of custom or practice . . . [, and] the disputed $400,000 portion of [Foster’s] salary clearly
represented compensation for his services . . . ” and should be apportioned to the state of California.
Id.
88. See In re Dorsey, No. 87-I-168, 1989 Wis. Tax LEXIS 8, at *10–13 (Tax App. Comm’n
Mar. 17, 1989). The court found compelling the fact that Dorsey’s contract stated his bonus was
refundable should he fail to report or should he leave the team without its consent. Id. at *10. It
concluded that the signing bonus represented income derived from a performance of personal
services, and thus compensation of services that were performed within the state of Wisconsin;
accordingly, the bonus should have been apportioned to the state. Id. at *13.
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individuals at different income levels bear significantly disproportionate tax
burdens. As illustrated in Table II, those athletes who earn the minimum
salary bear the greatest tax burden in proportion to their income, while those
who earn the greatest bear the least.
3. The Tax Does Not Discriminate
The third part of the four-part test articulated in Complete Auto Transit is
that the state tax cannot discriminate against interstate commerce.89 It
prohibits discrimination in two very distinct ways. First, “‘a State may not tax
a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it
occurs entirely within the State.’”90 Second, it must not discriminate against
interstate commerce by interfering with free trade.91 It is this guarantee of free
trade that is ensured, in part, by Complete Auto Transit’s fair apportionment
requirement discussed above.
In Scheiner, the Supreme Court determined that two Pennsylvania state
tax measures that imposed a flat marker fee and a flat axle tax on trucking
businesses were unconstitutional because they discriminated against interstate
commerce.92 Specifically, the marker fee discriminated against interstate
commerce by imposing a heavier burden on out-of-state carriers; the flat tax
was “plainly discriminatory” because the practical effect was to “impose a cost
per mile on [the out-of-state taxpayer] that [was] approximately five times as
heavy as the cost per mile borne by local trucks.”93 This discrimination
against interstate commerce was in violation of the Commerce Clause. In
addition, the Supreme Court held that the flat axle tax discriminated against
interstate commerce by impermissibly interfering with free trade.94 “If each
State imposed flat taxes for the privilege of making commercial entrances into
its territory, there is no conceivable doubt that commerce among the States
would be deterred.”95
The Tennessee Professional Privilege Tax has the same discriminatory

89. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
90. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987) (quoting Bos. Stock
Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977)).
91. See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 281 (“In its guarantee of a free trade area among States, however,
the Commerce Clause has a deeper meaning that may be implicated even though state provisions,
such as the ones reviewed here, do not allocate tax burdens between insiders and outsiders in a
manner that is facially discriminatory.”).
92. Id. at 271, 297.
93. Id. at 286.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 284.
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effects on interstate commerce as did the Pennsylvania flat tax in Scheiner. As
illustrated in Table III, the $2,500 flat tax results in a much greater tax burden
on professional hockey players who are non-residents of Tennessee as
opposed to those who are residents.
TABLE III
Total
Tax

Income
Per
Day

Tennessee
Privilege
Tax per
game

Tax
Rate

Net per
game

$525,000.00

$7,500.00

$2,536.23

$182.93

7.21%

$2,353.31

$2,500,000.00

$7,500.00

$12,077.29

$182.93

1.51%

$11,894.37

$7,500,000.00

$7,500.00

$36,231.88

$182.93

0.50%

$36,048.96

Salary

A professional hockey player who plays for the Nashville Predators and is
a resident of Tennessee is subject to a flat tax of $2,500 for each game he
plays in Tennessee, up to a maximum of three games. The maximum tax is
thus $7,500. However, he will play forty-one games in Tennessee.96 If we
allocate the total $7,500 tax over all forty-one games, the result is that he is
subject to a pro-rated tax of $182.93 per game. This is considerably less than
the $2,500 tax that a non-resident athlete is assessed per game.97 At every
income tax level, resident athletes thus pay significantly less tax per game than
non-residents.
Tennessee’s flat tax is analogous, then, to the flat tax in Scheiner, which
the Supreme Court found to be plainly discriminatory—the practical effect
was to burden the out-of-state taxpayer with a cost that was approximately five
times the cost imposed on the in-state taxpayer.98 In the case of Tennessee’s
Professional Privilege Tax, the tax is actually 13.67 times the cost imposed on
the in-state taxpayer. The Supreme Court also admonished that “acquiescence
in these flat taxes would occasion manifold threats to the national free trade
area[,]” a clear violation of the Commerce Clause.99
96. Half the games an NFL team member plays are in his resident state. Notice that the tax is
assessed on a per game basis but that an NHL player’s income is apportioned on a duty day basis
using the total number of days over the length of a hockey season. Therefore, the salary for a game
day would be equal to the player’s total salary divided by the total number of days in the season, in
this case 207.
97. In practice, NHL players who are members of a team other than the Nashville Predators are
non-residents of Tennessee. Non-resident athletes playing in the NHL or the NBA are generally not
scheduled to play in more than three games in any given regular season in the state of Tennessee,
which happens to be the maximum number of games for which a player can be assessed the $2,500
per game tax.
98. Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 286.
99. Id. at 285.
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Finally, Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax is discriminatory
inasmuch as it only pertains to resident and non-resident professional athletes
who perform services for the NHL and the NBA but fails to subject the same
tax on athletes who perform services for the NFL.
4. The Tax Must Be Fairly Related to the Services Provided
The Supreme Court “has acknowledged that ‘a State has a significant
interest in exacting . . . its fair share of the cost of state government.’”100 A
state
“[I]s free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by
the Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the state
has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has
given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it
has conferred by the fact of being an orderly civilized
society.”101
However, the fourth part of Complete Auto Transit’s test imposes an
important limitation: the tax must be fairly related to the services that the state
provides.102 While this suggests that the measure of the state tax must be
fairly related to the value of the services provided, the Supreme Court later
expanded on the fairly related requirement and interpreted it to mean that that
the tax must be “assessed in proportion to a taxpayer’s activities or presence in
a State . . . .”103 The requirement is thus closely connected to the first prong of
the Complete Auto Transit test—that is, the nexus requirement.104 It is the
taxpayer’s activities or presence in the state, then, that should bear a “‘just
share of state tax burden.’”105
However, there is an important exception to this rule. To the extent that a
state tax measure is levied on the use of particular public facilities (a “user
tax”), the tax is evaluated under a very different standard.
[A] user tax is valid only if it is related to the cost to the state
of the benefit provided to the taxpayer:

100. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 616 (1981) (quoting Dep’t of
Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978)).
101. Id. at 625 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).
102. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
103. Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 627; see also R. Douglas Harmon, Note, Judicial
Review Under Complete Auto Transit: When Is a State Tax on Energy-Producing Resources “Fairly
Related”?, 1982 DUKE L.J. 682, 683.
104. Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 625–26.
105. Id. at 626 (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
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“[W]hile state or local tolls must reflect a ‘uniform, fair
and practical standard’ relating to public expenditures, it
is the amount of the tax, not its formula, that is of central
concern. At least so long as the toll is based on some fair
approximation of use or privilege for use . . . and is . . .
[not] excessive in comparison with the governmental
benefit conferred, it will pass constitutional
muster . . . .”106
Recall, then, the Court’s ruling in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport
Authority District, in which the government imposed a $1 user fee for each
passenger boarding a commercial aircraft departing from the airport.107 The
$1 fee was upheld, even though it was unapportioned, because it satisfied two
essential conditions: it was neither discriminatory nor excessive.108 The
charge, the Court held, was not excessive inasmuch as it “reflect[ed] a fair, if
imperfect, approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they [were]
imposed.”109
Tennessee’s assessment of a $2,500 per game tax looks less like an
income tax—particularly in light of the fact that it is completely
unapportioned—and much more like a user tax. In this context, the amount of
the tax is relevant—and the fact that a $2,500 per game fee is assessed raises
serious concerns about whether it is a fair approximation of the use or
privilege for use of the state’s sports facilities. It also raises serious concerns
as to whether the fee is excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit
conferred.
In any event, the evaluation of Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax
under the fairly related requirement does not change the fact that the tax is
discriminatory.
IV. CONCLUSION
After having $2,500 withheld from his paycheck, Jon DiSalvatore was
later reimbursed because he was not on the Minnesota Wild roster for more
than ten days during the tax year and was thus exempt from the Tennessee
Professional Privilege Tax. Others are not so lucky. A professional athlete
who earns the minimum salary in the NHL and performs services in the state

106. Harmon, supra note 103, at 694 (quoting Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 716–17 (1972)).
107. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport, 405 U.S. at 709.
108. Id. at 716.
109. Id. at 717.
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of Tennessee—that is, he shows up on game day—will owe more in taxes than
what he earned that day.
Tennessee’s Professional Privilege Tax fails Commerce Clause scrutiny
because it is not fairly apportioned, it is discriminatory, and it is not fairly
related to the services provided by the state of Tennessee. The tax is therefore
unconstitutional and puts the state in serious jeopardy of potential lawsuits
from both the NHL Players’ Association and National Basketball Player’s
Associations. More importantly, Tennessee’s flat tax cannot be tolerated
because it will open the floodgates to other discriminatory state tax measures.
In the words of the Supreme Court, “acquiescence in these flat taxes would
occasion manifold threats to the national free trade area,” which is a clear
violation of the Commerce Clause.110

110. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 285 (1987).

